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CONTROL OF NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION THROUGH TAXATION
ELBERT

P.

TUTTLE

It is somewhat disconcerting to a lawyer who has followed the fortunes
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act through the Courts to read repeated
statements of Congressional and administration leaders all pointing to new
controls of agricultural production and consumption through the use of
processing taxes. Disconcerting, let us hasten to say, not because of any
appraisal of the policy of federal control of agriculture, because the lawyer,
as lawyer, is no more interested in the policy question involved in a planned
economy than are the courts. Disconcerting, however, because we thought
we had learned in United States v. Butler1 that such a plan was not permissible to the national government. The lawyer's perplexity is not allayed
when he finds that, in spite of the Butler case, Congress has already enacted,
and the President has approved, a processing tax on manufacturers of sugar
as a part of the Sugar Act of 1937,2 and that this processing tax is levied
as part and parcel of a plan looking to national control of sugar production,
both within and without the continental limits of the United States.
If it were not for these developments, the fate of the Triple A processing4
3
taxes, the repeal of the Bankhead Cotton Act, and the Kerr Tobacco Act,
not to speak of the Potato Control Act,5 might make unnecessary the inclusion
in any tax symposium of a consideration of the regulation of agricultural
production by taxation.
In the light, however, of the renewed and repeated statements that control
of agricultural production must be accomplished, and by the use of the
familiar though discredited method of taxing the processors and paying over
the proceeds from such taxes to the complying producers, it is important
to consider what methods can be used to restrict production through the
means of a system of taxation.
Since we are concerned not only with restriction but also with other
types of control, both of agricultural production and agricultural consumption, there are three possible types of tax devices that should be considered:
(1) Taxes that are in reality imposed as penalties, and in such
burdensome amounts as to exclude the idea of obtaining revenue.
Within this group come the Bankhead Cotton Act, the Kerr Tobacco
Act, and the Potato Control Act.
1297 U. S. 1 (1936).
2

Public No. 414, 75th Congress, approved September 1, 1937.
STAT. 598. 7 U. S. C. A. §§ 701-25.

'Cotton Control Act, April 21, 1934, c. 157, 48
'Tobacco Control Act, June 28, 1934, c. 866, 48

STAT. 1275. 7 U. S.
STAT. 782-793.

&Potato Act of 1935, August 24, 1935, c. 641, 49

801-833.

C. A. §§ 751-766.

7 U. S. C. A §§
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(2) Taxes that are imposed for the purpose of producing revenue
that can then be used to purchase regulatory compliance by federal
grants or contract payments to producers. This is the group that includes the invalidated A.A.A.'processing taxes.
(3) Taxes that are expected to be paid in substantial amounts,
which amounts will control either production or consumption by
throwing competitive conditions out of natural balance. Under this
classification come the tariffs and oleomargarine taxes.

Roughly speaking, the classification suggested above is given in the
order here used because, speaking again very generally, it may be said that
the taxes included within each group become progressively more likely to
withstand attack, depending upon whether they fall within group (1),
(2) or (3).
1. Penalty Taxes
No determination of the validity of either the Bankhead Cotton Act, 6
the Kerr Tobacco Act,7 or the Potato Control Act8 was awaited in the Supreme Court. Although cases involving the validity of these taxes were
pending at the time of the Butler decision, the Supreme Court in that case
trampled over the Bankhead Act in so rough-shod a manner that no compliance was sought with respect to any of these taxes thereafter, and Congress promptly repealed them. In the course of the Butler decision, the Court
said :
"It is pointed out, that, because there still remained a minority whom
the rental and benefit payments were insufficient to induce to surrender
their 'independence of action, the Congress has gone further and, in
the Bankhead Cotton Act, used the taxing power in a more directly
minatory fashion to compel submission."
That was the end of the Bankhead and similar crop control acts that in
effect taxed at rates as high as fifty per cent production in excess of Government-fixed quotas.
Even without the indication given in the language of the opinion in the
Butler case, the laws of this type could hardly have been seriously considered within the permissible range of federal action at any time. They
were similar in the manner in which they were intended to operate to the
taxes sought to be imposed which gave rise to the Child Labor Tax case
(Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company),"° and to the case of Hill v. Wal6Snpra note

3.

Supra note
note 4.
5.
'297 U. S. 1, 71 (1936).
8'Supra

11259 U. S. 20 (1922).
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lace.1 The laws involved in those cases purported to be tax measures, but
in reality they were intended not to raise revenue, but to regulate child
labor in the one instance, and trading in grain in the other. The law simply
imposed prohibitive levies upon persons who did not comply with certain
standards laid down by Congress. Obviously, what was sought was compliance with the standards and not the raising of revenue. In other words,
the success of the law would be measured not by the amount of taxes received by the Federal Government, but by the degree with which affected
persons avoided the tax by submitting to the required conditions. If not a
cent of revenue was received, the law would be a perfect success-a rather
strange test for a taxing statute!
Unquestionably, a similar result was sought by the Bankhead, Kerr, and
Potato Acts. Not a penny of revenue was sought. Much the same attempt
was made and precisely the same result followed the enactment of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act 12 in Carter v. Carter Coal Company, et al.'s
There the Court held that what purported to be a tax of fifteen per cent
on all coal mined, with a rebate of ninety per cent of the tax to producers
who complied with certain labor standards, was no tax at all, but a sanction
to compel compliance with code rules relating to the local business of production.
It seems clear, therefore, that these taxes, operating in a "directly minatory
fashion to compel submission" to agricultural control, are definitely out. They
are not taxing statutes and are not to be considered as such. This does
not mean, of course, that the courts will not sustain what is imposed under
the guise of a tax, but is really no tax at all, if it is a regulatory measure
in a field in which the Federal Government has the Constitutional power to
act.' 4 It is only where what purports to be a tax is, instead, a regulatory
measure concerning a subject matter with which the Federal Government
has no power to deal that the levy will' be held bad. 15
2.

Processing Taxes

There is, of course, nothing inherently bad with processing taxes; bad,
that is to say, from the standpoint of legality, since that is the only standpoint with which we shall here concern ourselves. Neither is there anything
fundamentally new in processing taxes. The only two new things about
them are the name and the use to which they have recently been put. The
Federal Government has the undoubted power to tax the business of making
u259 U. S. 44 (1922).

"Guffey-Snyder Coal Act August 30, 1935, c. 824, 49
801-827.

13298 U. S.238 (1936).

STAT.

991. 15 U. S. C. A §§

"Cf. Head Money Cases-Edye v. Robertson, 112 U. S. 580, 596 (1884).
uCf; I. W. Hambton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S.394 (1928).
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cotton into yarn, or of turning wheat into flour, if it sees fit to do so, and
that after all is but an illustration of what is meant by processing taxes.
However, in the light of the specialized use to which the words were put
as a part of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the term is now more than
likely to be taken in its specialized meaning, i.e., a tax on the processors of
an agricultural commodity to be used for the benefit of the original producers
of the commodity.
The reader is undoubtedly familiar with the principal features of the
taxing provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, and knows that benefits were provided for the producers of basic commodities such as cotton,
corn, wheat, hogs, rice, tobacco, and milk in order :16
"To establish and maintain such balance between the production and
consumption of agricultural commodities, and such marketing conditions, therefor, as will reestablish, prices to farmers at a level that will
give agricultural commodities a purchasing power with respect to articles that farmers buy, equivalent to the purchasing power of agricultural
commodities in the base period."' 17
The Act, of course, provided for a reduction in the acreage or in production
of the basic commodities through contracts between the Secretary of Agriculture and the farmers, provided that the funds required to pay these
benefits should be obtained by the levying of processing taxes on the first
domestic. processing of the respective commodities. It further appropriated
the proceeds derived from all taxes imposed under the Act and made them,
available to the Secretary of Agriculture for rental and benefit payments
to farmers.
Without question, this Act, or at least the taxing provisions of the Act,
were intended to produce revenue to the Federal Government and it was
hoped that the'revenue thus produced would be substantial.,' From that
standpoint, therefore, the taxing provisions did not fall within the condemnation of the type of taxes discussed under the first section. Critics
of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Butler case pointed out that
Congress was clearly within its taxing power in levying the processing taxes,
and that really what was being attacked was the appropriation of the proceeds
of the tax, and, therefore, under the familiar doctrine of Frothingham v.
Mellon,19 and Massachusetts v. Mellon, 20 no such attack was available to
the taxpayer. The Court- held, however, after the two schools of thought
loAgricultural Adjustment Act, May 12, 1933, c. 25, 48 STAT. 31, 7 U. S. C. A. §§
601-620.
'7The basic period in the case of substantially all commodities was designated as that
between
August 1909 and July 1914.
8
" The total amount collected in processing taxes exceeded $900,000.000.00.
"262 U. S. 447 (1923).
20262 U. S. 447 (1923).
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had been vigorously debated (as is indicated by the dissenting opinion written by Mr. Justice Stone and concurred in by two other Justices) that the
levy was in fact no tax at all because it was not an exaction of "taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises to pay the debts and provide for the common defense
and general welfare of the United States," 21 but that it was an exaction
of funds for carrying on a regulatory activity with which the Federal
Government could not interfere, to wit, "to regulate agricultural produc22
tion."
The decision by the majority in the Butler case was facilitated by reason
of the fact that the levy against processors was there specifically stated to
be for the purpose of producing funds with which agricultural production
could and should be regulated. This fact lent Weight to the Court's conclusion that it must consider the taxing sections and the regulatory provisions
of the Act as a single whole. To be sure, so far as would lie within the
reach of any taxpayer to complain, the purpose sought under the Agricultural Adjustment Act in the way of purchasing compliance by farmers with
a scheme of curtailment of production could easily have been accomplished
if the Agricultural Adjustment Act had concerned itself merely with the
provisions relating to regulation and benefit payments and the appropriation
of the funds with which to carry out the plan had been left for an entirely
different enactment. This is true because of the inability of the individual
taxpayer to raise effective protest against illegal expenditures by Congress,
23
no matter how glaring the illegality.
To be sure, this circumstance fully justifies the criticism that to hold the
Agricultural Adjustment Act bad because the taxing provisions were included within the four corners of the Act, whereas a different result would
have followed if they had been left for subsequent legislation, puts too great
a premium upon legislative draftsmanship. Professor Powell in his article,
written before but published just after the Butler case, after pointing out
that his prophecy as to the Court's expected action had gone awry, said :24
"The Court would be foolish to say that Congress could not do in
one way what it could do in another and thus kill the processing tax
just to give a lesson in legislative draftsmanship."
The circumstances that have been outlined in the beginning of this article will now present to the Supreme Court the problem of deciding just how
well Congress has learned its lesson in legislative draftsmanship, for it
seems conceded that the effort to reinstate the processing taxes with respect
-U. S. CONST. ART.

I, § 8.

=United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 61 (1936).

2

Frothingam v. Mellon, supra note 19.

z'See Powell, The Processing Tax and the Social Security Act (1936)
L. Rav. 125.

5 BR'KLY"
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to basic agricultural commodities will continue unabated until a measure
of control broadly comparable to that under the A.A.A. has again been
accomplished. In fact, as pointed out above, a start has already been made
in the Sugar Act of 1937.
With such an eminent authority as Professor Powell stating that he was
a poor prophet in prophesying that the processing tax in its substantive
features would not meet with judicial condemnation, it would be sheer folly
to attempt to prognosticate the future of the Sugar Act and of other
similar legislation which may be expected to follow. It is probably not out
of place, however, to discuss briefly some of the differences between the provisions of the Sugar Act and those provisions of the A.A.A. which were
intended to accomplish a similar purpose.
Two sharp attacks have been levelled against the decision of the Supreme
Court in the Butler case. The first is that though Congress has the undoubted power to levy an excise tax on the processing of agricultural
products, the Court held the tax levied under the A.A.A. unconstitutional
because of the use to which its proceeds were to be put. The second was
that the Court held the conditional grants for the benefits of farmers not
to be "for the general welfare." 25
As to the second of these attacks, limits of both time and space forbid
that we enter into a discussion of what is permissible under the authority
to levy "taxes.. for the general welfare." However, in view of the apparently determined effort of the Administration and of Congressional leaders
to attempt again the control of agricultural surpluses by the use of processing taxes, it is important to give some consideration to the first attack,
because it .will undoubtedly be a part of the legislative tactics to attempt to
draft any such regulatory laws as may be enacted in such manner as to deprive the taxpayer of any ground upon which he can launch an attack of
illegality.
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly pointed out, it is possible for Congress to engage in illegal ventures which it does not lie within the province
of the courts to prevent. Such an instance is the illegal appropriation of
federal funds. If we are to read the language of the Butler decision but
casually, it is clear that the Supreme Court has definitely held that the
Federal Government has not the power to appropriate funds in order to
regulate agricultural production. In answering the contention that Congress
had frequently in the past made appropriations for non-federal purposes,
the Court quoted from its prior decision in Massachusetts v. Mellon" and
recognized that the courts wvere powerless to prevent such improper appro'See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in United States v. Butler, 297 U.
S. 1, 79 (1936).
Supra note 20.
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priations, because "no remedy was open for testing their constitutionality
in the courts." The greater part of the Butler decision was devoted to
pointing out the evils that the Court feared would follow if the Federal
Government should be permitted to invade the province of the states and
regulate matters of local concern. The Court, however, recognized in the
language just quoted that the Federal Government could accomplish precisely the result objected to and that the courts would be powerless to interfere unless the illegal appropriation used to accomplish such improper regulation should be tied up either with a penalty through which the regulatory
measures could be attacked, or with a tax through the imposition of which
the taxpayer could raise the issue, as was done in the Butler case.
If Congress, therefore, is intent upon accomplishing agricultural regulation on a national scale and is not deterred by reason of the expressed opinion
of the majority of the Supreme Court that such regulation is illegal, the way
is open for the accomplishment of this result. Congress need only set up
the regulatory and benefit provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act
and appropriate the funds with which to carry them out from the general
revenues of the United States. Of course, having adopted such a program,
there is no provision of the Constitution that would prevent Congress from
levying a processing tax calculated to the dollar to be sufficient to pay the
benefits provided for under such a new Agricultural Adjustment Act; and
no taxpayer could resist payment of such processing tax, because the money
thus received would be derived from a revenue measure, pure and simple,
and would be available for the general purposes of government.
It is probably fair to assume that the Sugar Act of 1937 will be the model
for other processing tax acts if the lesson in legislative draftsmanship given
by the Supreme Court in the Butler case has enabled Congress to avoid in
the Sugar Act the pitfalls that were so apparent in the A.A.A. In the Sugar
Act, the provisions relative to the levying of processing taxes bear no apparent relation to the expenditures for benefit payments. The only connection between the benefit payments and the taxes there imposed is that they
both appear within the four corners of the same legislative enactment. There
is no bold statement in the Sugar Act that the revenues produced by the
processing taxes are appropriated "to be available to the Secretary of Agriculture for . . . rental and benefit payments and refunds on taxes." There
is no appropriation of the processing taxes contained in the Sugar Act.
Moreover, there is no reference in the sections relating to the levying of
the taxes to the fact that such taxes are levied in accordance with the general
policy of the Act, nor is the amount of the taxes made dependent, as it was
originally in the A.A.A., upon a finding as to the amount that was necessary
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to 'equal "the difference between the current average farm price for the
27
commodity and'the fair exchange value."
Under these circumstances, it might be a little more difficult for the Supreme Court to answer the contention of the Government that the part
of the statute levying an excise on processors should be considered independently of thepart which contains the prohibited regulatory provisions.
Because of the difference in the draftsmanship of the two measures, the
Court could ntt so readily say as it did in the Butler case:
"The Government in substance and effect asks us to separate the
Agricultural Adjustment Act into two statutes, the one levying an
excise on processors of certain commodities, the other appropriating
the public moneys independently of the first. Passing the novel suggestion
that two statutes enacted as parts of a single scheme should be tested
as if they were distinct and unrelated, we think the legislation
now, before
28
us is not susceptible of such separation and treatment."
There was some discussion among lawyers prior to the decision of the
Supreme Court in the Social Security Act cases 2sa (Helvering v. Davis,2D
Charles C. Steward Machine Ca. v. Davis,30 and Carmichael v. Southern Coal
& Coke Co. et al.)3 1 to the effect that the Court might have to decide there
whether the levying of a tax ostensibly for general revenue purposes as a
part of an act in which the legislative scheme was to provide Social Security
and unemployment relief would be considered as a general revenue statute
or would be infected with any weakness that might exist in the general plan'
with which it was legislatively connected. The Court did not find it necessary
to pass on this question. While the Social Security Acts were drawn in
such manner as to avoid any appearance on their face that the taxes there
raised were appropriated or to be used as a part of the Social Security
scheme, the Court did not need to find specifically that the tax provisions of
this-Act were entirely disassociated for the purposes of the legislation, because it held the purpose of the legislation to lie within the competence of the
national government. To be sure, in the Steward Machine Company case, the
opinion did state:
"Title III of the Act (the Title setting up the unemployment grants)
is separable from Title IX, and its validity is not at issue.
"The essential provisions of that title have been stated in the opinion.
As already pointed out, the title does not appropriate a dollar of the
'For the quoted portions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, see United States v.
Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 53 (1936).
'United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 58 (1936).
"For a full discussion of the Social Security Cases see article by Lester H. Orfield,
[Eupra p. 85-Ed.]

"57 Sup. Ct. 904, 301 U. S. (1937).
"57 Sup. Ct. 883, 301 U. S. (1937).
'81 L. ed. 818, 301 U. S. (1937).
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public moneys. It does no more than authorize appropriations to be made
in the future for the purpose of assisting states in the administration of
their laws, if Congress shall decide that appropriations are desirable. The
title might be expunged, and Title IX would stand intact. Without a
severability clause we should still be led to that conclusion. The presence of such a clause (Section 1103) makes the conclusion even clearer.
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235, 242; Utah Power &
Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165, 184; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U. S. 238, 312."
However, this determination was not essential to the decision and, therefore, is not binding authority.
The question as to whether a tax, in form a general revenue producing
measure, but included in a general act whose purpose is not permissible
under the Constitution, will be considered separately and sustained, or will
be regarded as part of the illegal scheme and stricken down still remains
an unsolved problem. If an attack is made on the taxing features of the
Sugar Act of 1937, it is clear that the Court will have to determine this
question, if it adheres to the position taken by it in the Butler case that
national control of production of an agricultural commodity cannot be legally
accomplished by a federal appropriation to purchase compliance with federal
rules.
Undoubtedly the regulatory features of the Sugar Act are sufficiently
similar to the outlawed A.A.A. to infect its conttol provisions with the
same vulnerability. It is only by holding the taxing provisions entirely separable from the condemned control features that the Court can, if it is
consistent, fail to outlaw the Sugar Act. It will probably be noted in this
connection that we have placed some stress upon the qualifying statement,
"if it is consistent." Many careful students of the Supreme Court have
more than intimated that, given another Butler case tcday, the Court
would decide it differently. Such an intimation can be dignified as being
more than a mere surmise when we consider the -bolte-face of the Court
between May 18, 1936, and April 12, 1937. From the Carter Coal Company
case3 2 to the Wagner Act decisions (National Labor Relations Board.v.
Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation and companion cases) 33 there elapsed
only eleven months in time, but this short period witnessed a shift from the
court's position that the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce did not extend to the establishment of labor conditions in the bituminous coal mining industry (although a substantial part of the coal produced
was directly sent in interstate commerce) to the attitude that national laws
regulating conditions of employment could validly apply to manufacturers
'Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S.

"301 U. S. 1 (1937).

238 (1936).
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who obtained materials in 'other states and whose products were substantially
all sold in other states.3 4
To the mind of the average practicing lawyer, there is no way to explain
satisfactorily the complete reversal of the Court's position from Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States 5 and the Carter Coal Company case to the
Wagner Act cases. The lawyer is, therefore, not presumptuous if he questions how long the pronouncement iii the Butler case will remain the law.
Undoubtedly the Court will be given the opportunity before long either to
reaffirm or recede from its position. The Sugar Act of 1937 may well
provide the test. In passing on that Act, however, the Court may of course
avoid the constitutional issue in the manner previously suggested by holding
that the taxing provisions are not so interwoven with the regulatory parts
as to make the entire Act invalid.
3.

Tariffs and Oleomargarine Taxes

There remains for discussion the type of levy that is intended to combine some of the features of both of the taxes heretofore discussed: the
tax that is levied on an article that, without the tax, would have an advantage in the market which, to the legislative mind, is not desirable. The
two typical examples of this tax are the protective tariff and oleomargarine
taxes.
If there were no tariff on the importation of sugar, it might well be
that foreign sugar producers would kill the sugar industry of our western
and southern states and in our non-contiguous territories. The presence of
a sugar tariff produces income, but it also erects a barrier behind which
American growers can charge more for their crop, and thus agricultural production in that particular field is fostered. While such protection has more
often been afforded industry as distinguished from agriculture, the same
procedure is available as against the importation of agricultural products
that would cut too deeply into the livelihood of the American farmer. Doubtless the reason the protective tariff has not been used more frequently for
the benefit of the agricultural population is that there is little demand for
f6reign agricultural products that can be satisfactorily raised in the United
States.
While there are probably some inconsistencies in ultimate effect, if not in
legal logic, between a recognition of the right of the Federal Government to
control agricultural production by use of the tariff and a denial of the right
to control it through the excise tax, 6 there can be no doubt under existing
'For an excellent discussion of the impossibility of reconciling these two positions,
see note (1937) 22 CORNELL L. Q. 568.
"295 U. S. 495 (1935).
'It was quite popular among the cotton growers of the South to speak of the processing tax on cotton as the "Cotton Farmer's Tariff."
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precedents that Congress nevertheless has the power. 7 That there is not only
inconsistency in result but also in legal reasoning between the Butler case
and the Hampton case is the conclusion arrived at in an analysis by Professor
Henry M. Hart, Jr., in an article entitled "Processing Taxes and Protective
Tariffs."3 8 Professor Hart urges with great force that in the fostering of
American industries by means of the protective tariff, as is avowedly done
by the Tariff Act of 1930,39 Congress is engaging in an act of governmental
regulation which is no more permissible than is the power to regulate
agriculture. The Court in the Butler case said Congress could not do the
latter under the guise of a tax though the Constitution specifically grants the
power to tax. The Court said in the Hampton case that Congress could do
the former under the 'guise of a tariff exaction although authority to exact
the tariff arises from the same clause of the Constitution. 40 In the Hampton
case, the Court laid considerable stress upon the fact that the first Congress,
which included in its numbers many members of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, construed the duty levying powers of the Constitution as authorizing a protective tariff, and pointed out that the second act adopted by the
Congress of the United States on July 4, 1789, contained the following recital:
"Section 1. Whereas
for the discharge of the
ment and protection of
wares and merchandises

it is necessary for the support of government,
debts of the United States, and the encouragemanufactures, that duties be laid on goods,
imported:"

While there may be some inconsistency between the construction of the duty
levying power of the Constitution as adopted by the Court in the Hampton
case and the construction of the tax levying power as circumscribed in the
Butler case, the Court nevertheless did- adopt as one of the canons of construction the view that:
"A contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when
the founders of our Government and framers of our Constitution
were actively participating in public affairs,
41 long acquiesced in, fixes
the construction to be given its provisions."1
It may also be that a further distinction should be made, namely, that
while the taxing power is restricted to the levy of taxes "for the general
welfare," the imposition of duties on imports is authorized not only under
the Taxing Clause but also under the Commerce Clause; and there is no
"general welfare" limitation in the commerce clause, so that the Governof foreign commerce is, as has been said, "exclusive and
ment's regulation
I
J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928).
8(1936) 49 HARv. L. Rav. 610.
nM ariff Act of 1930, c. 497, June 17, 1930, 46
"Supra note 21.
"276 U. S. 394, 412 (1928).

STAT.

590, 19 U. S. C. A. §§ 1001-1654.
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plenary" and since the power has been granted, the motive or the effect
of such levy cannot be questioned.
After the Hampton decision and before the Butler case, the Supreme Court
had veered from the theory that the protective tariff had to be justified under
the taxing power to the position which it announced in the case of
University of Illinois v. United States,4 that the power in question is
referable to the commerce clause of the Constitution. As is pointed out by
Professor Hart, 42 " that decision was a convenient way for the Court to justify

the imposition of a tariff on articles bought by a state institution which,
under the taxing power, might not have been permissible on the theory that
the Federal Government had no power to tax the instrumentalities of the
state. Nevertheless, unless the Court should feel that the Butler case
amounts to a reversal of the Hampton decision and of the theory of justifying
the tariff as set out in University of Illinois v. United States, there is ample
authority for Congress to affect in a vital manner both agricultural production and consumption through the tariff device.
It is probably unnecessary to include in this discussion any extended consideration of other types of federal taxing statutes which, in the minds of the
public, at least, are intended to regulate conduct rather than to obtain
revenues for the national government. However, something should be said
about this type of legislation in the light of the significance which has been
attached in the Butler case to the purpose of a tax levy. There is probably
no person who is at all familiar with the oleomargarine tax 43 who does not
consider it as a means whereby sales of butter substitutes can be restricted,
either for the purpose of preventing deception in local trade or for the
benefit of the dairy industry. Of course, neither the prevention of deception
nor the regulation of production or consumption of dairy products is a concern of the Federal Government. Because of the similarity of the type of
federal control, mention might also be made of the narcotic taxes. 44 Our
federal court 'dockets are filled with prosecutions of dope peddlers. It would
probably be a surprise to a good many of these unfortunates to realize that
their prosecution and conviction is for a crime against the public revenues.
The narcotic acts generally are understood by laymen to be laws enacted by
the Federal Government for the suppression of the sale of narcotics because
of the inherent harm in the traffic. Of course, Congress has no power to
interfere with any' such traffic as a moral or social measure.
However, in spite of the fact that these several laws are generally knov
42289 U. S.48 (1933).
,aS1pra note 24.
"August 2, 1886, c. 840, 24 STAT. 209, 26 U. S.C.A. § 970 et seq.; May 9,1902, c. 784.
32 STAT. 193, 21 U. S. C. A. § 25; 26 id. §§ 971 et seq.
"Dec. 17, 1914, c. 1, 38 STAT. 785, 26 U. S. C. A. §§ 1040-1051, 1053, 1054, 1383-1391.
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to be regulatory in purpose and effect, the courts have consistently upheld
them, and, in doing so, have put them to the extreme test, because the cases
in which they were assailed have generally been on the criminal side of the
court. The Supreme Court has taken the rather general view in sustaining these
acts that if the levy of the tax and the regulations issued ostensibly for the
purpose of assisting in the enforcement of the taxing provisions bore some
reasonable relation to the raising of revenue, the acts could be sustained.4 5
In the McCray case, which arose from a violation of the Oleomargarine
Act, the Court said:
"Since, as pointed out in all the decisions referred to, the taxing power
conferred by the Constitution knows no limits except those expressly
stated in that instrument, it must follow, if a tax be within the lawful
power, the exertion of that power may not 4be
6 judicially restrained because
of the results to arise from its exercise.
In the Doremus case, 47 the Court also said:
"Nor is it sufficient to invalidate the taxing authority given to the
Congress by the Constitution that the same business may be regulated
by the police power of the state. License Tax Cases, supra.
"The Act may not be declared unconstitutional because its effect may
be to accomplish another purpose as well as the raising of revenue. If
the legislation is within the taxing authority of Congress-that is sufficient to sustain it....
As might well be expected, the language of the Court in the McCray case
gave the Supreme Court some concern in arriving at its decision in the
subsequent Child Labor Tax case. 49 The only real distinction between the
permitted powers as found in the oleomargarine cases and the prohibited
tax in the child labor case must be found in the following language, in which
the Supreme Court sought to distinguish McCray v. United States0 and
another earlier case from the one then before the Court:
"In neither of these cases did the law objected to show on its face.
as does the law before us, the detailed specifications of a regulation of a
state concern and business with a heavy exaction to promote the efficacy
of such regulation." 5'
The narrowing line of demarcation between what is permissible and what
is prohibited to the Federal Government in using the taxing device to regulate conduct becomes all the more attenuated when it is considered that, as
"McRay v. United States, 195 U. S. 27 (1904) ; United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S.
86 (1919) ; Webb v. United States, 249 U. S. 96 (1919).
"195 U. S.27, 59 (1904).

"Supra note 45.
18249 U. S. 86, 93 (1919).

"Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20 (1922).
M195 U. S.27 (1904).

-259 U. S.20, 42 (1922).
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the A.A.A. processing taxes were destroyed by a six to three decision in
the Butler case, both the oleomargarine taxes and the narcotic taxes
were sustained by a sharply divided bench. Under the authorities as
they now stand, however, so long as Congress avoids expressing within the
four corners of a particular act too close a relationship between a tax levy
and the regulatory motive, such excises as that contained in the oleomargarine taxing act can still be made to serve the purpose of benefiting the
producers of certain types of agricultural products and thus increasing the
consumption of those products and, conversely, restricting the productibn
and decreasing the consumption of other less favored articles.
Conclusion
No attempt has been made in this article to discuss the remote and incidental effects which all taxes have upon production and consumption of
agricultural commodities, but we have given attention only to -those levies
whose purpose is largely regulatory, whether expressed or not. Where
Congress has attempted to interpose a so-called tax as a sanction to prevent
conduct with which the national government has no constitutional authority
to interfere, it seems clear that it is foredoomed to failure. Where taxes are
imposed by the Federal Government to provide the sinews of war with which
to combat an accumulation of local evils that bulk large enough to challenge national concern, it seems that the validity of such taxes may well
depend upon the extent to which they are earmarked for the regulatory
purpose. The Butler case followed as the result of'too close a tie-in between
the levy and the prohibited activity. Where duties or tariffs have been imposed under the exercise of the power granted in the Commerce Clause, or
where the Court cannot say that the exaction bears no reasonable relation to
the revenues, even though the very payment of the tax affects the internal
economy of the states, the courts have declined to interfere.
While there seem to be some possible inconsistencies between the language
of the Butler case and the holdings in the tariff, oleomargarine, and narcotic
cases, it is not too hazardous a guess to say that the Butler case is not
likely to be extended in its application. Under the present tendencies
and in the light of the most recent cases reflecting the Court's opinion on the
limits of Constitutional power, it is extrerhely likely that the exercise of the
taxing power to affect and regulate the lives of the citizens will become
more deeply entrenched rather than meet with any further sharply defined
barriers.

